Electrical impulses or something more – who are we, really?
Dr Jakob Hohwy works with neuroscientists and psychiatrists to shed light on one of the central questions of philosophy – the relationship between mind and body. His unique laboratory uses illusions to test the boundaries of how we perceive ourselves in our bodies. His discoveries may help to provide a new way of understanding delusions and other disorders in mental health.
For 2500 years philosophers have been divided on questions of the human mind and our sense of identity. Are our minds just machines powered by electrical impulses? Or is there something more, a way of perceiving and feeling the world in relation to experience that sets us apart from robots?
Jakob works on this question in partnership with neuroscientists from the Monash Alfred Psychiatry Research Centre and from overseas, supported by funding from the Australian Research Council. The team studies mental health phenomena, such as delusions, to gain insight into consciousness.
“When you have a clock and you can’t figure out how it works, you pull out some of the cogs and wheels to see what happens,” Jakob explains.
In his unique laboratory in the Department of Philosophy, Jakob carries out experiments that can shake even the most rational person’s beliefs of themselves.
One of these is the rubber hand illusion, invented in 1998 by two US researchers. The study participant sits at a table with their arm out of view behind a partition. A rubber hand attached to a sleeve sits in front of them.
The researcher then taps both the rubber hand and real hand in a synchronised manner. After a few minutes, the combination of sensory and visual information leads the test subject to start thinking of the rubber hand as their own.
“The sense of being in our body and the sense of how it works is very flexible,” Jakob says.
He has found that if the rubber hand is replaced with a cardboard box, the person will still develop this sensory confusion, thinking of the box as their hand.
Neuroscience is increasingly finding truth in the philosophical view that the brain functions as a machine, using available evidence to find patterns and guess what will happen next.
The rubber hand illusion leads Jakob to hypothesise that people who suffer from delusions because of conditions such as schizophrenia may in fact be much more rational than we think.
If a schizophrenic patient’s disordered brain spontaneously starts confusing input to the senses, as simulated by the rubber-hand illusion, then it would be completely rational for the patient to consider supernatural involvement in this slippage.
The theory of the brain as a seeker of patterns can now be investigated using non-philosophical methods.
“We can use mathematical models of how neurons work to test this very simple idea,” Jakob says.
He and his collaborators also investigate the interaction between emotion and moral decision-making.
“We make people sad, upset, indifferent or happy, and see how it affects their decision-making,” he says. “We think our moral reasoning is not abstract and iron clad but instead tied to the way we feel and the context we find ourselves in.”
He confronts test subjects with hypothetical choices, such as a method of distributing food aid. One option is efficient, with all meals getting distributed. A second is fair, with all deserving people getting fed, but some meals going to waste.
Will a greater understanding of neuroscience ever provide answers to the mind-body dilemma?
“Some of them are perennial problems, but we can use science to reformulate their philosophical frameworks and improve our understanding of our place in nature,” Jakob says.
Hohwy, J., 2012, Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain, Frontiers in Psychology [E], vol 3, Frontiers Research Foundation, Switzerland, pp. 1-14.
Vandoorn, G., Hohwy, J., Symmons, M.A., 2012, Capture of kinesthesis by a competing cutaneous input, Attention, Perception & Psychophysics [P], vol 74, issue 7, Springer, New York USA, pp. 1539-1551.
Hohwy, J., Rajan, V., 2012, Delusions as forensically disturbing perceptual inferences, Neuroethics [P], vol 5, issue 1, Springer, Netherlands, pp. 5-11.
Hohwy, J., Fox, E., 2012, Preserved aspects of consciousness in disorders of consciousness: A review and conceptual analysis, Journal of Consciousness Studies [P], vol 19, issue 3-4, Imprint Academic, United Kingdom, pp. 87-120.
Paton, B., Hohwy, J., Enticott, P.G., 2012, The rubber hand illusion reveals proprioceptive and sensorimotor differences in Autism Spectrum Disorders, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders [P], vol 42, Springer LLC, NY United States, pp. 1870-1883.
Hohwy, J., 2011, Mind-brain identity and evidential insulation, Philosophical Studies [P], vol 153, issue 3, Springer, Netherlands, pp. 377-395.
Hohwy, J., 2011, Phenomenal variability and introspective reliability, Mind & Language [P], vol 26, issue 3, Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, UK, pp. 261-286.
Hohwy, J., Paton, B., 2010, Explaining away the body: Experiences of supernaturally caused touch and touch on non-hand objects within the rubber hand illusion, PLoS ONE [P], vol 5, issue 2, Public Library of Science, USA, pp. 1-10.
Hohwy, J., Reutens, D., 2009, A case for increased caution in end of life decisions for disorders of consciousness., Monash bioethics review [P], vol 28, issue 2, Monash Univerisity ePress, Clayton, Australia, pp. 14.1-14.12.
Hohwy, J., 2009, The neural correlates of consciousness: new experimental approaches needed?, Consciousness And Cognition [P], vol 18, Elsevier, Netherlands, pp. 428-438.
Hohwy, J., Roepstorff, A., Friston, K., 2008, Predictive coding explains binocular rivalry: An epistemological review, Cognition, vol 108, issue 3, Elsevier, Netherlands, pp. 687-701.
Hohwy, J., 2007, Functional Integration and the mind, Synthese, vol 159, issue 3, Springer, Netherlands, pp. 315-328.
Hohwy, J., 2007, The search for neural correlates of consciousness, Philosophy Compass, vol 2, issue 3, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford UK, pp. 461-474.
Hohwy, J., 2007, The sense of self in phenomenology of agency and perception, Psyche, vol 13, issue 1, Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, United States, pp. 1-20.
Hohwy, J., 2006, Internalized meaning factualism, Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, vol 34, issue 3, Springer Verlag, Netherlands, pp. 325-336.
Hohwy, J., Rosenberg, R.-., 2005, Cognitive neuropsychiatry: Conceptual, methodological and philosophical perspectives, World Journal of Biological Psychiatry, vol 6, issue 3, pp. 192-197.
Hohwy, J., 2005, Explanation and two conceptions of the physical, Erkenntnis, vol 62, issue 1, Springer Netherlands, Netherlands, pp. 71-89.
Hohwy, J., 2005, The Nature of Consciousness, by Mark Rowlands, Philosophical Psychology, vol 18, issue 1, Routledge, United Kingdom, pp. 149-151.
Hohwy, J., Rosenberg, R.-., 2005, Unusual experiences, reality testing and delusions of alien control, Mind and Language, vol 20, issue 2, Blackwell Publishing, UK, pp. 141-162.
Hohwy, J., Frith, C.D., 2004, Can neuroscience explain consciousness?, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol 11, issue 7-8, Exeter: Imprint Academic, UK, pp. 180-198.
Hohwy, J., 2004, Evidence, explanation, and experience: On the harder problem of consciousness, The Journal of Philosophy, vol 101, issue 5, New York Journal of Philosophy, USA, pp. 242-254.
Hohwy, J., 2004, The experience of mental causation, Behaviour and Philosophy, vol 32, issue 2, Cambridge Center for Behavioural Studies, United States, pp. 377-400.
Hohwy, J., Frith, C., 2004, The neural correlates of consciousness: Room for improvement, but on the right track, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol 11, issue 1, Imprint Academic, United Kingdom, pp. 45-51.
Hohwy, J., 2004, Top-down and bottom-up in delusion formation, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, vol 11, issue 1, The Johns Hopkins University Press, United States, pp. 65-70.
Hohwy, J., 2003, A reductio of Kripke-Wittgenstein's objections to dispositionalism about meaning, Minds and Machines, vol 13, issue 2, Springer, Netherlands, Netherlands, pp. 257-268.
Hohwy, J., 2003, Capacities, explanation and the possibility of disunity, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 17, issue 2, Routledge, United Kingdom, pp. 179-190.
Hohwy, J., 2003, Critical Notice: When Self-Consciousness Breaks, by Lynn Stephens & Graham, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, vol 8, issue 3, Psychology Press, UK, pp. 237-242.
Hohwy, J., 2002, Deflationism about truth and meaning, Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol 40, issue 2, University of Memphis, Department of Philosophy, United States, pp. 217-242.
Hohwy, J., 2002, Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol 83, issue 3, Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd., United Kingdom, pp. 235-252.
Vandoorn, G., Hohwy, J., Symmons, M., Howell, J., 2012, The more they move the less they know: cutaneous capture of kinesthesis?, IEEE Haptics Symposium 2012, 4 March 2012 to 7 March 2012, IEEE, USA, pp. 177-182.
Hohwy, J., 2010, The hypothesis testing brain: Some philosophical implications, ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th Conference of Australasian Society for Cognitive Science, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Sydney NSW Australia, pp. 135-144.
Hohwy, J., 2009, Correlates of consciousness, philosophical perspectives, The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK; New York, US., pp. 203-207.
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