Social structures that enable action require widespread acceptance of their intellectual bases. So we formulate concerns to fit the range of solutions available to us. Where we act outside the ‘terms of reference’, we give the system legal and literal grounds to ignore us.
While frustrating, it is worth remembering the effort that society goes to to establish and maintain its working institutions. Recognising that the intellectual and institutional tools with which we are looking at Y2K are inadequate, however, doesn’t get us far on its own. There are wider frameworks within which things happen and we must look for them.
Anything that is up and running in society is so because people have invested solidly in it. Whether it is community health centres or an F-111 fighter plane, all fit into extensive social structures which enable them to be recognised, used, repaired and so on. From this perspective Y2K is a problem of investment and legitimacy: the acceptance it is accorded.
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| Associate Professor Frank Fisher. |
Quite aside from the human effort and time involved in fixing things, there is the threat to investments that Y2K constitutes. There is also a difficulty in recognising that machinery one has bought in good faith and which has functioned well to date is fundamentally flawed.
So, what makes Y2K a bother? Basically, it represents a threat to social infrastructure upon which all society relies irrespective of class, gender or ethnicity. And while eminently simple in origin, it is profoundly hidden, and there is no certainty even among experts about its extent or the infallibility of cleansing actions (short of total hardware replacements).
From this it is not difficult to see the deep issue hidden in this glitch of glitches: the vulnerability in building deep social infra-structures on technologies and techniques that depend on specialists, and moreover, on specialised organisations of specialists that work largely beyond the reach of our political structures.
Our institutions are not yet adequate to the data-handling capacities now at our disposal. This is not a new phenomenon – initially print went beyond, say, the Vatican’s capacity to control it. What is new, however, is that virtually anyone in industrialised societies can now gain mechanical access to Y2K-ridden technologies, developing a vested interest that effectively creates their own vulnerability.
One of the very first lessons I learned as a sales engineer in one of the world’s great heavy electrical engineering firms was the place of trust in the many transactions between stakeholders. Our institutions really do only function because of it.
Could there be a lesson in here for us, who face life in a world where increasingly our formal structures are inadequate to the burdens placed on them by innovations driven by entrepreneurial capitalism? What ‘meta-organisation’ can we turn to to complement entrepreneurial capitalism by enhancing trust between people? What social mechanism can give us the social and physical infrastructure to live suddenly without the largely invisible, automated, expertise-dependent infrastructures currently quaking in anticipation of Y2K?
Many mechanisms supply bits and pieces of necessary social capital, but none pull it all together and set out to render our social capital open, accessible and debateable to all citizens.
One which may just fulfil many of these roles simultaneously would be the reintroduction of national service as civil defence, not simply as military defence. Civil defence training would provide training for all emergencies, military included. It would encourage application of its principles to existing emergency services such as fire brigades and surf lifesaving clubs. It would not compete with them, but would dramatically enhance the social context in which they work.
If we were organised to deal with breakdown, we would all know a lot more about what it takes to run a hi-tech society like our own. Social responsibility would improve. Our technical infrastructures could be built more flexibly, cheaply, and with much greater openness, enabling simpler repair and simpler transformation as inevitable obsolescence overtakes them.
A pity such a scheme could not be in place before 31 December 1999.
Associate Professor Frank Fisher is director of the Graduate School of Environmental Science at Monash University.
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People concerned about the millennium bug can approach the year 2000 with cautious optimism, according to the man responsible for raising Australian awareness of the issue, Mr Graeme Inchley. They should, however, remain vigilant until the critical period has passed, advises Mr Inchley (BEd 1973), chief executive officer of the Federal Government’s industry program for the year 2000, or Y2K, problem. Mr Inchley is overseeing a major awareness campaign and the development of strategies to cope with Y2K-linked failures. Y2K potentially affects a range of date-based systems, from personal computers to traffic lights and security systems, with 1 January 2000 a critical point. "Although we can’t afford to be complacent, the evidence suggests we are among the best-prepared countries in the world," he says. "The preparedness of our key infrastructure providers in areas such as electricity, telecommunications, banking, aviation, water and fuel is second to none."
Overseas the situation is less clear. While the US, Canada, the UK and some European countries have been working diligently on Y2K issues, a number of late-starting nations have been reluctant to publicise their Y2K programs. Australian authorities have stressed the need for contingency planning in industry, particularly among small businesses. Planning might cover tasks like backing up data files, providing manual back-up and increasing inventories – although people are advised not to go overboard. "We have to be careful not to blow the Y2K issue out of proportion," Mr Inchley says. "It’s important that the impacts of contingency plans are also analysed. If too many organisations depart from a ‘business as usual’ approach, Y2K could become a self-fulfilling prophecy simply because so many people are behaving abnormally." Monash information technology lecturer Mr John Carpenter says enough work has been done in Australia for people not to feel too apprehensive about the approach of 1 January 2000. "A lot of large organisations have put the effort in," he says. "My Visa card, expiry date /01, works, and I found that reassuring." Things have gone wrong on a large scale in Australia before - Victoria's gas cut-off, major fires and floods, Sydney's water crisis - and people have coped, he points out. "The gas cut-off and the water problem didn't really cause chaos, rather a fair bit of running around by individuals with individual circumstances, quite different to a major fire or flood," he says. "With Y2K, I expect a lot of minor hiccups but with the infrastructure - in the main - to keep rolling on." And his own contingency plans for January? "I'll be taking a couple of weeks off, with the intention of staying at home and spending time with friends and neighbours." - Josie Gibson |
| For details of study opportunities in the Graduate School of Environmental Science at Monash, contact Ms Liz Anderson on (03) 9905 4624. |
